Toward a Theology of
the State*
John M. Frame
Originally published in Westminster Theological Journal 51:2
(Fall, 1989), 199-226. Part was given as a lecture on the occasion of my
assuming the title Professor of Apologetics and Systematic Theology at Westminster
Theological Seminary in California.
There has been much discussion
recently among evangelical Christians about the biblical view of civil
government. Several events have encouraged us to pursue this topic: (1)
the remarkable recent change in American fundamentalism from an apolitical
stance to strong political involvement, (2) evidence from elections and
polls that evangelicals do have the power to influence government policy,
(3) the advancement and vigorous promulgation within evangelicalism of
various incompatible views of the role of government: traditional
Anabaptism,[1] traditional
Lutheranism,[2]
the "intrusion ethic" of Meredith G. Kline,[3] "theonomy"
or "Christian reconstruction,"[4], and "principled
pluralism."[5]
Clearly this is a time of political opportunity for Christians, but also a
time of challenge. We need to determine from the word of God what
we should seek to achieve in the political arena, and we need
the grace of God to obtain the courage and the love to do what
is right.
I will not be able in this paper to
discuss all the pros and cons of the various views. I shall, rather, first
tell you some of the conclusions I have reached from past studies, so
that you will know "where I am coming from." To save time, I shall present these
conclusions with little or no argument. Then I shall seek to build upon
the conclusions in hope of making some progress toward a biblical view of
the state.
I. Hermeneutical
Prolegomena
First, then, my starting points: (1)
God's word in Scripture is the supreme authority for all areas of human
life, and therefore must be confessed as infallible and inerrant.
(2) Everything God says in Scripture
applies to us today (Rom. 15:4, I Cor. 9:10, II
Tim. 3:16f).
(3) Scripture is sufficient as a transcript of
God's will for all areas of human life (II Tim. 3:16f, Isa.
29:13, Matt. 15:1-10).
(4) Old Testament law, specifically,
continues to exercise authority over the New Testament believer
(Matt. 5:17-20, Rom. 13:8-11, I Cor. 9:8ff, 21,
James 4:11f).
(5) The New Testament does, however,
indicate some discontinuities between the law and the believer in Christ.
The law is not our ground of acceptance with God (Rom. 3:19ff
Gal. 2:21, 3:1-25), and in Christ we are set free from the curse of the
law (Gal. 3:10-14). We are also freed from the burdensome legal tutelage,
even bondage, imposed on the Old Covenant people of God because of their
immaturity (Gal. 3:23-25, 4:1-7, 21-31). Therefore, many of the Old
Testament ordinances are "shadows," no longer to be observed
because fulfilled in Christ (Mark 7:19, Gal. 4:8-11, Col. 2:16-23, I Tim.
4:1-5, Heb. 8-10).
(6) In order to understand God's
laws, it is necessary to know something about the situations to which
those laws were addressed.
(7) In order to understand how God's
laws apply to us today, it is necessary to compare our situation with
the situations originally addressed. Only insofar as our situation
is the same as the original will the law apply literally.
(8) Therefore a change in situation
always leads to some change in the application
of a law. This principle bears not only upon the application of Old
Testament laws to New Testament believers. It is a general principle of
language. For instance, in Matt. 21:2, Jesus tells two disciples to find
him a donkey and colt to ride into Jerusalem. Imagine a Christian sect
which took this "law" as a command for today: each year,
perhaps, around Palm Sunday, every church member would buy, beg or steal a
donkey for Jesus to ride into Jerusalem. Now Matt. 21:2 is not an
Old Testament "law," but a New Testament one. But the
same hermeneutical considerations apply to both Testaments.
Our knowledge of the situation to which Jesus addressed the
command shows us that this command was of local and temporary
application and is not to be literally followed today. It does apply to
us today by telling us of Jesus' determination to fulfill
prophecy and to accomplish his redemption. It also motivates us to
imitate our Lord's
purposefulness and willingness to bear his cross.
But it is not literally
applicable. But if that is true even of New Testament texts, how much more
likely it is to be true of legal material from the Mosaic Covenant which
Heb. 8:13 represents as "obsolete" and "aging?"
(9) In determining the present-day
applications of Old Testament law, we must always reckon with both
continuity and discontinuity. That is to say, there is always a sameness
and a difference between the way a law applied in its original setting and
the way it applies today. That is true, for instance, in the trivial sense
that today each law applies to a different group of hearers than those to
whom it was originally addressed. Even the creation ordinances, whose
applications are paradigms of constancy, show that level of discontinuity.
The ordinance of labor, for instance, will require one person to be a
carpenter, another a secretary, depending on his or her gifts
and opportunities. Consider also the decalogue,
another group of ordinances accepted by Christians as largely applicable
today: Even here there is discontinuity as well. We no longer honor
our parents that we may prosper in Palestine, as Ex. 20:12
commanded Israel under Moses (cf. Paul's re-application in Eph.
6:1ff). However much continuity there is, there is always
some discontinuity. If this is true even of the creation
ordinances and the decalogue, how much more
likely is it to be true of case laws given to the Mosaic theocracy?
(10) God established Old Testament
Israel as a holy nation, distinct from all the nations of the earth (Ex.
19:5f, Deut. 7:6). A holy nation is ruled differently from
other nations. Most all of us recognize that the laws given to
Israel concerning animal sacrifices, dietary laws, clothing and
grooming were not literally applicable to nations outside Israel, nor
do they literally bind nations today. The New Testament speaks
to some of those issues directly (Heb. 10, Mark 7:19, I Tim.
4:3-5). We should not, however, require explicit statements from the New Testament
in order to reach such judgments. Sometimes there are indications in the
Old Testament itself as to the limited applicability of divine commands
(see (11) below). And sometimes no explicit indication of limitation is
really needed. Consider Matt. 21:2, our previous example of a command
which is not literally applicable today. There is no explicit statement in Scripture that this
"law" has lost its literal applicability. God expects us to use
our exegetical skill: in this case, just plain common sense.[6]
(11) It is likely that the special
holiness of Israel influences to some extent the penalties required
for transgressions under the Mosaic law. For instance, Deut.
14:21 bases a prohibition of eating creatures already dead upon
the fact that "you are a people holy to the Lord your God."
Indeed, Israel is permitted to give or sell such food to aliens
and foreigners, an odd qualification if eating such things were morally wrong. Most likely, then, eating
such food is not wrong for everybody, but only for God's holy people, for
whom he has provided a great bounty of food in the land flowing
with milk and honey. Another example: Vern Poythress
has argued persuasively from the language of the passages that the
penalties for false worship in Deut. 13 and 17 are also based on
the special holiness of Israel.[7] Note that the infractions
take place "in the land" (17:2, 4) by covenant members (17:2),
and these are executed by the people of God (17:7) by the herem destruction
by which the wicked, pagan cities of Canaan were totally wiped out
(13:16).
(12) It is unlikely, however, that
the special holiness of Israel invalidates all literal application of Mosaic laws and penalties today.
The penalty of double restitution for theft, for example (Exod. 22:4, 7) is a matter of simple justice:
the thief restores what was taken, and as a penalty he loses
an equivalent amount. He loses, then, what he had hoped to
gain. There is no good reason to apply this penalty only to Israel as
a holy nation. Indeed, there are many good arguments for
adopting such penalties today in place of our failed prison system.[8] Of course, all crime
is related to the holiness of Israel. Bloodshed "pollutes the
land," and that is forbidden, "for I, the Lord, dwell among the
Israelites" (Num. 35:33f). But the death penalty for murder is not
based upon the holiness of Israel. It was given to Noah many years before
Israel became a nation (Gen. 9:6). The holiness of Israel merely adds an
additional reason for the use of the death penalty, much as Deut. 5:15
adds to Exod. 20:8-11 an additional reason for
Sabbath observance. That additional reason no longer applies literally to
modern civil law, but the original reason does. Therefore, even
when Israel's special holiness is mentioned in connection with
a penalty of the law, that fact does not necessarily rule out
the literal applicability of the penalty.
(13) We ought, therefore, in our
efforts to apply biblical laws and penalties, to be open to various
possibilities: (a) the law in question is based on the special holiness
of Israel and is not literally applicable, though it will
always teach us something important for our faith and life, (b) the
law in question is literally applicable to us, (c) the law may
be somewhere in between (a) and (b): more or less literally applicable,
with some modifications or adjustments from changed circumstances.
("Literal" and "non-literal" are matters of degree, of
course.) Poythress argues that the penalties
for sexual sins are in category (c), for they are concerned
with protecting inheritances, a matter which had a special
importance under the Old Covenant, but which still concerns us in
some measure.[9]
(14) The traditional distinction
between moral, civil and ceremonial law is still useful as a catechetical
device, but not helpful in resolving concrete problems of application. In
asking how a particular law applies to us, we do not assign it first
to one of those three categories and then deduce from that
its applicability. Rather we ask first concerning its
applicability, and on the basis of that conclusion we then assign it to
one (or more) of the three categories. The law does not, of course,
come to us with the labels "moral," "ceremonial" and
"civil" attached to its provisions. What we call
"moral" laws are mixed together in the texts (almost randomly,
it seems) with "civil" and "ceremonial" laws, and we
must sort them out by determining their meaning and current applicability.
Those that apply most literally today we call "moral," those
which apply least literally we call "ceremonial."
"Civil" is a different kind of category, based not on
applicability but upon function, and these would be divided between
"ceremonial" and "moral" depending on their
applicability. Remember too, that literal and non-literal applicability is
a matter of degree, so we may expect some "gray areas," some
laws that do not fit neatly into either "ceremonial" or
"moral" categories.[10]
(15) It is therefore necessary for
us to do careful exegetical study in the law itself in order to determine
its applications, rather than simply trying to make deductions
from broad theological principles (see (21) below).[11]
The above convictions and other
considerations have led me to some conclusions about the various schools
of thought mentioned earlier:
(16) I have not been persuaded by the
Anabaptists that the state is necessarily Satanic and that therefore
Christians are faced with the choice either of meek submission or
of peaceful opposition. Certainly there have been Satanic states, but
I don't see the state as necessarily being under Satan's domain. However,
the Anabaptist exegesis of Rom. 13, in which God "orders" the
state without giving it any normative authority, is unpersuasive to me,
and the Anabaptists do not, in my view, rightly assess the continuities
between the Old and New Testaments.
(17) In my view, the Lutheran
distinction between the kingdoms of God's right and left hands is
insufficiently anchored in Scripture.
(18) Meredith Kline's
"intrusion ethic," while containing much biblical insight,
argues for a religiously neutral state based on inadequate biblical
premises and a too sharp dichotomy between the Mosaic and the New
Covenants.[12]
(19) Principled pluralism, while
presenting eloquently the case against religious neutrality in politics
and the importance of government's becoming sensitive to
different religious communities within the nation, fails adequately
to ground its pluralism itself in the biblical text. In fact I find a
contradiction between the emphasis here on the unavoidability of religious
commitment and the simultaneous insistence that the state should not be
biased in favor of a particular religion.
(20) That leaves theonomy,
to which I have a strong initial attraction, because of its earnest
adherence to sola Scriptura and
its willingness to wrestle seriously with the details of biblical law in
formulating its positions. However, I believe that theonomists
sometimes underestimate the complexity of the continuities and
discontinuities between Old and New Testaments and thus often jump to
wrong conclusions about the present-day applications of Old Testament
laws. Also, I find their actual view of the state inadequate, for reasons
I shall mention later.
(21) There is no broad theological
scheme or principle which is capable of resolving all, or even a great
number of, our specific application problems at the same time. This is the
case, first, because exegesis of the actual laws reveals a
wide diversity in the kinds of application and in the degrees
of continuity and discontinuity between them and our present situation
((13), (15) above). Second, because of the inadequacies of the various
available schemes, summarized above. Third, however, all the available
schemes allow for both continuity and discontinuity. Let me refer in this
connection to two of the proposed schemes which may be regarded as extreme
on the sides of discontinuity and continuity respectively: the intrusionism of Meredith Kline and the theonomy of Greg Bahnsen.
Meredith Kline, whose rhetoric sometimes suggests an almost total
discontinuity, nevertheless finds within the Mosaic law elements carried
over from earlier biblical covenants, together with "faith
norms" and "individual life norms" which continue to be
normative for us today. In trying to exempt "community life
norms," including the state penalty structure, from this continuity,
Kline is in my judgment utterly unpersuasive. But even here he seems
willing to allow for continuities between the Mosaic penalties and our time, as
long as those penalties are not derived exclusively or distinctively from
the Mosaic covenant. On the other hand, theonomists,
whose rhetoric sometimes suggests total continuity between the Mosaic law
and our present situation, do recognize both redemptive-historical and
cultural changes that prevent literal application of many such laws today.[13] Therefore, whether
we are Klineans or theonomists,
whether we focus on discontinuity or continuity, we have not thereby
settled any exegetical issue.
Both continuity and discontinuity are allowed in either scheme, and therefore,
in one sense, neither scheme settles anything.
II. The Nature of
the State
So much for my "starting
points." Now I would like to try to build upon these basic
convictions in order to seek a better understanding of the biblical
teaching concerning the state and the applications of that teaching to our
present situations.
"State" is not a biblical
category in the sense that "family," "people of God,"
"Israel," and "church," are biblical categories. God
established the family at creation (Gen. 2:24). In Ex. 19ff, God
established Israel as a nation, as the people of God. The church is, in
one sense, the whole people of God from Adam to the present, in another
sense a fresh historical expression of that community based specifically
upon the apostolic confession of Christ (Matt. 16:18f). But in
what passage did God establish the state?
Some have found divine warrant for
the state in Gen. 9:6, where God commands Noah's family to return
bloodshed for bloodshed. But this is a command given to a family. There is no indication here
of any new institution being established. And in the law of Moses, the
execution of murderers was carried out, not by the state as such, but by
the "avenger of blood," kin of the murder victim, Num. 35:19,
21, Deut. 19:12. The family,
here, is the instrument of justice. We have no reason to believe,
therefore, that any special institution beyond the family for the
establishment of justice was created in Gen. 9:6.
What we see in Scripture, rather, is
a kind of gradual development from family authority to something which we
would tend to call a state. The borderline between family and state
is not sharp or clear.
From the beginning there was
authority within the family. Adam exercised authority over his wife by
virtue of his "prior" ("pre-eminent"?) existence (I
Tim. 2:13). We see that authority in his acts of giving common and proper
names to her, Gen. 2:23, 3:20. Though Eve sinned before Adam, Romans
5:12-19 traces human sin back to Adam, giving to him the ultimate
responsibility for the fall. Sarah called Abraham her "lord,"
Gen. 18:12, a respectful address urged by Peter (I Pet. 3:6) as a good
example to godly women. The authority of parents over children is
evident in the patriarchal narratives and enshrined in the
fifth commandment of the decalogue (Ex. 20:12).
That authority includes the use of physical punishment, as is indicated in
the frequent references to the "rod" in Proverbs (13:24, 22:15,
23:13, 29:15).
Adam, Eve and their children formed
what we would call today a "nuclear" family. But when Cain and
Seth married and formed households, the human race became an
"extended" family. God had mandated that when a man marries he
shall "leave" his father and mother and begin a new household
(Gen. 2:24), but this change did not relieve adult children of all
relationships to, or responsibilities toward, their parents, or vice
versa. The patriarchs evidently maintained close relationships with
their grown sons and their families, even nephews, as witnessed
by Abraham's concern for Lot (both military and priestly:
Gen. 14:1-24, 18:16-33). Note especially the story of Jacob's
family from Gen. 34 to 50. Jacob, in fact, was in a position to
prevail upon his sons to go to Egypt for provisions (Gen. 42:1f). At the end
of his life, like Noah and Isaac before him, he pronounced prophetic
blessings on each of his sons (Gen. 48 and 49:1-28). Job, who many believe
to have lived in the patriarchal period, also maintained close
relationships with
his grown children and carried on a priestly ministry on their behalf
(1:1-5). Leviticus 19:32 urges respect for the aged. The responsibility of
grown children to provide for their aged parents is presented in
very strong terms in the New Testament (Matt. 15:3-9, I Tim. 5:8),
as an implication of the fifth commandment of the decalogue.
In Scripture, then, one is responsible, not only to himself, or
to his "nuclear" family, but to his extended family as well. He
owes respect and service to his parents and grandparents. He is
not under their authority as when he was a child (cf. Gal. 4:1f),
but he continues to honor them in various ways.[14]
Jacob's family multiplied and became
a nation. From nuclear family, it became an extended family, and then a
"clan," or indeed a group of clans. Exod.
6:14-25 lists the "heads" of various Israelite clans; cf.
references to the "elders" of Israel in Exod.
3:16ff, 4:29, 12:21, 17:5f, 18:12. The descendants of Reuben formed four
clans, each descended from one of Reuben's sons. Similarly, six clans of
Simeon. Seven clans of Levi are mentioned, each related to one of Levi's
grandsons.[15] After Israel left Egypt, Moses evidently
played a role in selecting "leaders" of the tribes, Exod. 18:21-26. 16. I am not clear on the relation
between the "officers" of Exod. 18:21-26
and the "elders" mentioned earlier in Exodus. Was Moses merely
creating a new judicial role for the already existing elders? Or was this
a new level of government, corresponding to the first, perhaps,
as the American judiciary corresponds to the executive? Or was
Moses taking control of the traditional processes by which
tribal elders were chosen? I am inclined to think both the first and
the third suggestions were actually the case. Note that Num. 1 and
2 list names of leaders, appointed by God through Moses, of each
of the twelve tribes. That these are called "leaders of
their ancestral tribes" and "heads of the clans of Israel"
(Num. 1:16) suggests that Moses' appointees were also the
more-or-less hereditary elders of the tribes.[16] The leaders of
"tens" might be the heads of the nuclear families themselves,
those of "hundreds" the heads of more extended families and so
on up to the thousands. I would expect, however, that in making
his choices Moses may have had the right on occasion to reject
a hereditary leader in favor of someone more gifted or more faithful.
However one sorts out that data, it
is clear that beyond the authority of the nuclear and extended families
there was government associated with the tribes and with the clans of
those tribes, at various levels. And, as a fourth type of
government, we should notice Moses himself, chosen by God to lead the
whole nation to the edge of the promised land. Moses' authority,
of course, was unique. It came not by heredity, nor by the appointment
of another man, but by God himself. Moses was, first of all, God's
prophet. A prophet may be defined as one who has God's words in his mouth;
and God gave his words to Moses (Ex. 4:10-17) through a relationship of
unique intimacy (Ex. 33:7-34:35, Num. 12:1-15). Moses, then, became the
chief of the prophets, the paradigm of the prophetic office (Deut.
18:14-22). But Moses was more than a prophet. Unlike later prophets such
as Elijah and Isaiah, Moses was @UN(the) leader of Israel. He
was commander-in-chief of the army (Ex. 17:8-16, Num.
21:32-35, 31:1-24). He was the final
judicial recourse
(Ex. 18:22, 26). He received from God the law and the divine direction of
the wilderness journey. Much of his activity seems to us
kingly rather than merely prophetic. Certainly no human king with
the exception of Solomon ever had such complete control over
the nation.
Moses was not high priest; his
brother Aaron fulfilled that role. But Moses did come from the priestly
tribe of Levi, and Exod. 4:14-17 suggests that
Aaron's authority, originally at least, was derived from that of Moses.
And Moses' intercessions for Israel (as Exod.
32:7-14) suggest a sense of priestly responsibility.
The picture to this point, then, is
that as Israel developed from nuclear family to extended family to clan
to nation, family authority became more elaborate and complicated. In
time, God introduced new institutions. The heads of extended families were
no longer exclusively responsible for prophetic and priestly ministries as
were the patriarchs. Rather, God relieved them by assigning many religious
duties exclusively to the priests, Levites, and prophets.
Was there, at this point in history,
also a divinely appointed "state?" I would say no if, again,
"state" refers to something above and beyond the natural
authority of the family. As far back as Gen. 9, as we have seen, God
called the family to execute vengeance for bloodshed, and so no new order
was needed to administer capital punishment.[17] There was, of course,
in Moses' time, a national army to be commanded, but even that
has its precedents in tradition (Gen. 14).[18] New machinery,
of course, was put in place (by some combination of tribal
tradition and Mosaic appointment) to resolve disputes, but that too
was essentially a family function.
Moses himself should not be seen as
the occupant of a new "perpetual office" in Israel. He was a
"charismatic" official, one with a direct appointment from God.
Joshua did succeed Moses and inherited Moses' powers; but Joshua, also,
was directly appointed by God (Num. 27:18-23, Deut. 31:1-8, Josh. 1:1-9),
and no one after him had such comprehensive authority over
the nation. Apart from his prophetic and priestly functions,
Moses was essentially the chief of the clan leaders, the head of
the family of God. Had God not selected him directly, the
people might well have selected him or someone else as a chief
of chiefs, without violating the overall family structure. Such
a choice would merely have been a natural continuation of
the movement toward greater complexity as the nation increased
in size. Indeed, there was popular ratification of Moses' rule. When
Moses returned to Egypt from the desert, the elders "believed,"
indeed "bowed down and worshipped," Ex. 4:31. And after God,
from Mount Sinai, appeared to
the whole people,
the people requested through their elders that God not again speak
to them directly, but that Moses serve as mediator (Exod.
20:19, Deut. 5:5, 23-33, 18:16).
During the period of the judges, no
new institutions were added. God raised up judges, new charismatic
leaders, to deliver Israel from its enemies (Judges 2:16). These judges
were not only military leaders, but they had broad authority to command obedience
within Israel (Judges 2:17).[19] One of
them, Deborah, was also a prophet (Judges 4:4), as was, of
course, Samuel (I Sam. 3:19-21). Samuel, though an Ephaimite
rather than a Levite (at least on his father's side, I Sam.
1:1), exercised priestly functions (probably implied in I Sam.
2:35f; cf. 3:1, 7:9, 17, 10:8), recalling the unity of prophet,
priest and king in the patriarchs and Moses, and foreshadowing
Christ. Again, however, this charismatic leadership did not produce
any new, continuing institution in Israel. Government by
tribal elders continued as during the time of Moses. Indeed, in the case of
Jephthah, the judge receives his authority, humanly speaking, by the
appointment of the elders (Judges 11:1-11). Under Samuel, the elders
continued to command armies (I Sam. 4:3) and to determine such courses of
action as the recovery of the sacred ark (4:3).
The anointing of Saul as the first
king of Israel (I Sam. 9:16-10:1) does mark the beginning of something
new. For the first time, there is to be in Israel a continuing line
of monarchs, normally linked by heredity (though of course God often disrupted
that hereditary pattern for his own purposes). The institutional change,
however, is not a radical one.
The kingship comes as God's response
to a demand from the people. The people's motives in making their request
were largely sinful (I Sam. 8; cf. Deut. 17:14, Judges 9), but God had
planned to raise up kings for his people (Deut. 17:14-20) and had
given them in the law a proper method of choosing one. It is
important to note that in Deut. 17, the king is to be chosen by the
people (verse 15). As with the appointment of Moses and that of at
least some of the judges, there is a human choice to be made.
This choice certainly does not prevent God from playing a direct
role in the selection process, but it does necessitate a human
choice in addition to whatever role God may himself choose to play.
Saul was chosen both by God and by
the people. God revealed to Samuel that Saul was to be anointed (I Sam.
9:16ff), and only after the anointing did Israel recognize Saul as
king. Samuel presented Israel to the Lord by all its tribes and
clans (I Sam. 10:19), and they drew lots to determine the king.
By God's appointment, the lot fell upon Saul, whereupon the
people rejoiced (10:24). Later, they are said to have "confirmed Saul
as king in the presence of the Lord" (11:15). Similarly, when
Saul later proves unfaithful, Samuel is called to anoint a new
king, David (I Sam. 16:1-13). Long afterward, however, after the
death of Saul, David is anointed a second time (II Sam. 2:4), this
time by the people as king of Judah. Still later, he was anointed
a third time by the "elders of Israel" to be king over the
entire nation (5:1-5). Involved in this appointment was a
"compact" between David and the elders (5:3).
Solomon, the next king, was in
effect appointed by his father David and anointed at David's behest (I
Kings 1:28-48). There is no indication of a popular ratification of
Solomon's rule, but the new king did have to deal with some initial opposition
to his reign before the kingdom was "firmly established in Solomon's
hands" (2:46). From that point, we gather, there was a general
consensus in favor of Solomon (3:28, 4:29-34), though see 11:14-40. Very
different was the situation with Rehoboam,
Solomon's son, who, having failed to satisfy the demands of "the
whole assembly of Israel" (12:3), and having rejected the advice of
"the elders" (12:6, 8),[20] lost the allegiance
of ten tribes. God had promised to make Jeroboam a king (11:29-39), and
the ten tribes "made him king over Israel" (12:20).
I will not seek to trace the
kingship through its long history. The pattern ought to be clear at this
point, and I don't believe it is contradicted in later texts, though the
later texts tend to be less explicit about the details of the
process by which a person became king.[21] The kingship is both
a charismatic office and a popular one: that is, both God and
the people play roles in its establishment and continuance. It is
God who sets the standards for the kingship (Deut. 17:14-20) and
who frequently raises up men of his choice for the work,
removing others for their unfaithfulness. Nevertheless, by divine
warrant, the people of Israel also make a choice. From the viewpoint
of the people, they are selecting another tribal ruler, a "chief
of chiefs," who bears the same sort of authority held by the
other chiefs or elders, but over a broader territory. They have
the right-- at least God does not contest it-- to reject a ruler
such as Rehoboam who will not rule according to
their desires.[22]
A similar development, evidently, takes
place in the nations outside the people of God. Lamech
the descendent of Cain sings a song of vengeance in Gen. 4:23f. As family
head, he sings to his two wives about how he will execute vengeance
for bloodshed. Unlike the simple reciprocity implied in Gen. 9:6
and in the Mosaic law of talion (Ex. 21:23-25), Lamech boasts that he will avenge seventy-seven times!
"Family justice" indeed, but exaggerated far beyond anything our
God would recognize as just. Still, we can see that, as in the believing
line, the mentality of kingship springs up in the context of the nuclear
and extended families.
Meredith Kline argues that this
theme is resumed in Gen. 6:1-4. He believes that the offense which draws
forth God's condemnation is the exercise of royal polygamy: earthly
kings ("sons of God") accumulating harems ("daughters of
men").[23] Whatever
we may say about that exegesis, it is likely that the table of nations in
Gen. 10, like the genealogy of the believing line in Gen. 5, is not a
complete record of all who lived on the earth, but rather a record of
notable leaders, perhaps kings. At any rate, it is clear that the
development of kingship was rapid in the world in general compared to its
development in Israel. When Israel first asked for a king, it seemed to
them, at least, that "all the other nations" already had them (I
Sam. 8:5).
Kings in the "other
nations" were known for conscripting laborers, soldiers, and wives,
and for collecting extortionate taxes for private gain (Deut. 17:16f, I
Sam. 8:11-18). History reminds us of the terrible, Lamech-like
cruelties imposed by pagan kings in the name of royal vengeance. Still,
the formal institutional picture is not different from what we have seen
in Israel. The pagan kings abused their powers, but so,
certainly, did the Israeli kings. The pagans did not have
greater powers than did the kings of Israel. Even outside the
covenant, the powers of the king come from God (cf. Rom. 13:1-7). And
the pagan kings, like the Israeli kings, had essentially the power
of tribal elders, however widespread their territory might be.
Once kingship appears in history,
are we then able to speak of an "institution of the state?"
Well, it isn't too important what you call it, as long as you understand
what is going on. Yes, God has ordained authority within the family.
Yes, he warrants the extension of that authority to extended
families, tribes, nations. Yes, he warrants the popular selection
of leaders to implement that authority (a selection into which,
of course, he is always free to intervene, and over which he
always exercises providential superintendence).[24] Yes, that authority
includes the power to use deadly force and to resolve disputes which
cannot otherwise be resolved. In that sense, we may say with Paul in Rom.
13:1 that "the authorities that exist have been established by God."
But it is important to remember that the authority of the state is
essentially a family authority, not something different. For that reason,
I consider it somewhat misleading to talk about a "divine institution
of the state," or to speak of "family, church and state" as
"God's institutions," on a level with one another. I shall,
however, use "state" to refer to the family elder-structures
beyond the nuclear and extended families.[25]
Let me now address some potential
problems in this analysis:
1. Diversity in
Modern States
Is it legitimate to think of
political authority as tribal eldership, even in modern nations within
which there is no discernible tribal unity? What of the U. S. or U. S. S.
R., with people of many diverse backgrounds, or South Africa in
which various racial groups are sharply estranged from one
another? Well, God has never decreed that "tribes" should
forever maintain uniform, and to say that he has is to adopt the heresy of
racism. Israel itself was joined by a "mixed multitude" when it
left Egypt (Ex. 12:38). The line of the Messiah included the
Canaanite Rahab and the Moabitess
Ruth. Membership in Israel (even physical Israel, to say nothing of
spiritual Israel) is not limited to physical descendants of Abraham, Isaac
and Jacob. The founders of the U. S. opened its borders to people of many
nations, inviting them to join the tribe. Whatever practical problems
this diversity produces, it does not change the essential nature
of civil government. Certainly God has not given us
additional revelation author
izing us to change the nature of government
in response to these cultural trends.[26]
2. State
Interference in the Family
Some may find my view of the state
rather ominous because it might be used to compromise the common Christian
insistence on the protection of the family from state interference. If, as
I am saying, the state is simply the government of the
mega-family, then how could the nuclear family be protected from
its often unwanted and unhelpful intrusion? How can family
be protected from family?
I would answer simply by stressing
the distinction between nuclear family and mega-family or tribe. As I
mentioned earlier, Scripture probably forbids the nuclear family
to exercise capital punishment among its members, so as not
to compromise the ties of affection which bind that unit and so as to
require involvement of the wider community in such a weighty decision.
There are powers given to the mega-family which are not given to the
nuclear family, and vice-versa. It is helpful to remember here that the
state, as a tool for resolving disputes, is essentially a system of
appeals courts. The rationale of the Moses-Jethro
organization of Israel in Exod. 18:17-27 is not
to center authority in one man who would then make all the decisions, but
rather the reverse: to free up Moses so that he would not have to consider
every little problem. By analogy, I would think that the "officials
over thousands" would not seek to solve all the problems among their
people, but would hear cases "too hard" for the officials over
hundreds, and so on down the line. Thus the chief decision-making unit is
on the "tens" level-- possibly the nuclear family itself. The
higher levels of state power only handle cases too small to be
decided locally. The essential localism, the from-the-bottom-up nature
of this organization protects the nuclear family against
intrusive assaults from broader courts, but also allows the wisdom of
the wider community to be brought in cases where the nuclear
family admits its inability too handle a problem. This is
essentially the same model presupposed in Presbyterian church courts.
3. Education
Related to the above is the
contemporary Christian concern about education. State schools in the U. S.
have proven to be inadequate academically and especially religiously, as
they have sought to impose a secular humanist ideology upon
their students. Yet the state seems determined to maintain a
virtual monopoly on general education by denying tax resources
to schools which are not state controlled. Responding to
this situation, Christians have argued that this is an unjust
state intrusion into the proper prerogatives of the family. But can
we maintain this critique if we regard the state as also, in
one sense, "family?"
I think we can. I agree with the
contemporary Christian argument that God commits the overall education of
children to the parents (e.g. Deut. 6:4ff, Proverbs). And let us now
note that he commits it to parents, not grandparents or uncles or aunts.
The education of young children is the task of the nuclear family, and it
is, of course, to be carried out in an atmosphere saturated in God's word
(Deut. 6:6ff). Again, the distinction between nuclear family and tribe is
an important one. The extended family would enter the picture only if and
when the nuclear family is unable or unwilling to carry out
its responsibility.
I conclude, therefore, that state
authority is essentially family authority, developed and extended somewhat
by the demands of number and geography. Thus I believe we
may eliminate from our consideration the views of the Lutherans and Meredith
Kline, as well as others, who see the state as a distinct institution
ordained by God, with powers and responsibilities different from those of
the family. We may also set aside the Anabaptist view that the state is
essentially allied with Satan, without denying, of course, the possibility
of Satanic states, or at least of Satanic rulers of states.[27]
III. The State and
Religion
We must now ask concerning the
religious character of the state, so conceived. Does God permit the state
to make a religious commitment? Does he command it to? In a word, yes
to both questions.
In the first place, God calls all
human beings to repent of sin and to put their trust in Jesus as Lord and
Savior. Those who have believed in Jesus are to do all things to his glory
(I Cor. 10:31; cf. Rom. 14:23, II Cor. 10:5, Col. 3:17, 24). Anything the believer does,
therefore, must be done according to God's standards and out of a motive
of love for him. This principle certainly bears on any human associations,
whether for business, education, charity, worship, art, recreation,
study, government or whatever. The believer must press the royal
claims of Christ in all areas of life. And to do that is, of course,
to work toward Christian standards and practices in all
those associations, so that there will be Christian
businesses, Christian schools, Christian media, Christian charities, Christian
churches, Christian art, Christian recreations, Christian scholarship,
and, of course, Christian government. Why should government be any
different from any other project in which the believer is involved? If we
promote Christian schools because Christ is to be Lord of all of life,
doesn't the same argument apply to government? And once Christian
standards become the norm in such institutions, why should that
institution not formally recognize that commitment by confessing Christ?
In the second place, God claims
families with a special zeal. He chose the process of childbearing as the
means by which his son would enter the world and announced that fact at
the beginning of redemption (Gen. 3:15). He saved the family of Noah from the flood (6:18, 7:1, 13, 8:16ff), and he
gave to that family dominion over the earth and the right to
avenge bloodshed (Gen. 8:20-9:17). He called Abram, promising to bless his
offspring, and to bless all nations through that offspring (Gen. 12:7,
15:4f). God commanded as a sign of the Abrahamic covenant an injury to the
male organ of generation, and he commanded that that sign be applied to
all of Abraham's family including the young children (17:9-27). Similarly,
Israel, the family of Jacob, was to circumcise its males on the eighth day
of their lives (Lev. 12:3) to acknowledge God's claim upon all
their seed. (Cf. also the consecration of the firstborn by ransom
of his life, Ex. 13:12.) Certainly, then, there is nothing
strange about a family head professing faith in God on behalf of
his household. "Choose for yourselves this day whom you will
serve," said Joshua, "but as for me and my household, we will serve the Lord" (Josh. 24:15).
Household commitments, indeed
household baptisms, are also found in the New Testament (Acts 2:39, 11:14,
16:15, 16:31, 18:8, I Cor. 1:16). To me and
others, these references are a strong argument in favor of infant baptism:
surely first century Jews would have understood these events as a
continuation of the Old Testament practice of claiming households for God
and of administering the sign of the covenant to all those in
the household. At any rate, God continues to call families.
The importance of the family to God is not exhausted when the
"seed" of Gen. 3:15 comes in Christ. Rather, Christ himself, now
at the right hand of God the Father, continues to work through
families to extend his kingdom throughout the earth (Matt. 28:19ff).
And indeed, his goal is not only to rule families, but
extended families, tribes, nations (Psm. 2, 72,
110, Matt. 25:32, 28:19, Rom. 4:17f, Gal. 3:8, Rev. 2:26, 12:5, 15:4,
20:3, 21:24ff, 22:2).
On my earlier account, states are
family governments. If a family is to profess Christ as Lord, its
government must do the same. If a tribe or nation is to profess Christ as
Lord, its government, the state, must do the same.
A non-Christian family-state should
also profess its religious commitment. For there is no neutrality, for
states any more than for individuals. Those who are not for Christ
are against him. A non-Christian state is, of necessity, committed
to something other than the God of Scripture, and in honesty it ought
to confess that fact. In practice, it may be difficult for some states to
formulate their religious commitments, because of multiple religions among
the citizens and rulers. But even a state in such a situation can tell us
what it is not committed to. If
it wishes to profess Christ despite the diversity of individual
commitments, it should do so; if it wishes to deny the authority of Christ
over it, it should indicate that as well.
IV. The State, the
Church, and the Kingdom of God
The kingdom of God is that sovereign
exercise of God's rule "where not merely God is supreme, for that is
true at all times and under all circumstances, but where God
supernaturally carries through his supremacy against all opposing powers
and brings man to the willing recognition of the same." (27) What
is the relation of the state to that kingdom?
As I mentioned earlier, God uses the
family as a means to bring his salvation into the world. The family was
the vehicle for the incarnation. After Jesus' resurrection, the kingdom
grows as God claims families for himself and, in time, nations.
The state also serves the kingdom by
extending the righteousness of God in the earth (Matt. 6:10). When the
state acquits the innocent and punishes the guilty, it is a ministry
of God (Rom. 13:1-7). As states come more and more under
the influence of God's word, their judgments will become more
and more righteous.
The family, therefore, and the state
as the government of the tribe, do play roles in God's redemptive kingdom.
Family and state are not our saviors from sin, but they are tools, as
well as objects, of God's saving rule.
Beyond this general role, we find in
the Old Testament that God made special use of one particular family, the
family of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. He chose them from among all the
other nations to be his uniquely holy people (Deut. 7:6). In
the tabernacle and temple, God dwelled in the midst of Israel as
in he dwelled in no other nation. He gave them special blessings
of protection and provision. He gave them human gifts:
prophets, priests and kings. He gave to them the unique blessing of
written "oracles of God" (Rom. 3:1ff). And indeed, because of
their special holiness he also punished them for their sins
with swiftness and severity (Amos 3:2, see our earlier discussion).
The "special holiness" of
Israel reflected in the law is, I think, essentially the special presence
of God in the tabernacle and the temple, a presence which created a
"zone" of holiness within which persons, animals, houses and the
like had to be ceremonially pure. Israel's laws had to account for
that reality, just as the laws of all nations must account for
the real situations of those nations. (Not to be irreverent, but
if Beaver County had a population of 100,000 elephants, there
would have to be numerous laws regulating the comings, goings,
diets, training, disciplining, etc., of elephants. Israel's problem
was similar, but much more awesome in its implications.)
God blessed Israel by his special
presence so that Israel could fulfill the promise to Abraham that in his
seed all the nations would be blessed. Israel enjoyed God's
special friendship, not for its own sake, but so that it might be
a witness to the nations of God's grace and judgment (Isa.
43:10ff, 44:8f) and, eventually, so that they might present to the
nations their Messiah as King of kings and Lord of lords.
Ultimately, Israel bore false witness, and they lost their special
standing with God. Though many Jews believed in Jesus, the nation's
rulers rejected him; and thus God rejected them.
But the people of God continued in a
new form. The church, composed of Jews and Gentiles (with, of course,
their families) as equal members of one body, was the "Israel
of God" (Gal. 6:16). The olive tree of Abraham continued, but
with some old (Jewish) branches broken off and some new
(Gentile) branches grafted in (Rom. 11:11-24). The church received
the titles of Israel: "a chosen people, a royal priesthood, a
holy nation, a people belonging to God" (I Pet. 2:9f, cf. Ex.
19:6, Tit. 2:14).
The new form of the people of God
involved many new things. No longer was there a literal tabernacle or
temple; Jesus himself was the temple, and he dwelt, by his spirit, within
his people, so that in a sense they
became the temple (John 2:19ff, I Cor. 3:16f,
6:19, II Cor. 6:16). Nor was the new people of
God identified, even roughly, with a particular group of clans or tribes;
it became an international body destined to cover the globe (Matt.
28:19f). It had a government, as did Israel, but that government did not
possess the power of the sword (Matt. 26:51), but "only" the
"sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God" (Eph. 6:17). It
conquers through love, rather than by violence (Matt. 5:38-48, Rom.
12:9-21).
No modern nation, or its government
(state), then, will ever play the distinctive role filled by Old Testament
Israel. God's purposes now are wider and broader; the whole world is
the promised land (Matt. 28:19ff, I Cor. 3:21ff,
Eph. 6:3 (cf. Ex. 20:12)). We need no longer the types and shadows of
the tabernacle and temple, for we have the reality in Christ
(Heb. 8-10). Modern nations still play the very general kingdom
role noted earlier, as objects and tools. But even believing nations,
if such there be, will not play the distinctive role of Israel, and
therefore their governments, the "states" will not need to take
those purposes into account as they rule.
In the modern world, then, each
Christian is a citizen of two nations: An earthly nation like France,
England, or the U. S. A., and the heavenly nation (Eph. 2:6) (not of this
world, John 18:36), the church. Though we belong entirely to Christ, we
do not on that account renounce our citizenship in the
earthly nations, any more than we leave our earthly families. Indeed,
we seek to be good citizens, for those earthly nations
themselves, and their rulers, received their authority from God
(Rom. 13:1-7). The church has its national and tribal leaders,
its elders and deacons (I Tim. 3), who not only preach and
teach, administer sacraments, etc., but also provide services that
the elders and kings provided in Israel. They resolve disputes (I Cor. 5:1-6:8) and lead in battle (Rom. 13:12, Eph. 6:10-18,
I Thess. 5:8).
The state also continues to have its
leaders, who perform the corresponding services for their clans. We seek
as much as possible to be obedient to both, though we are first of
all citizens of heaven. When we have disputes we can't settle with other
believers, we take them to the church elders; when we have similar
disputes with unbelievers, we take them to the state. When we seek
leadership in the battle against Satan, we turn to the rulers of the
church, for the state can't help us there; when we seek defense against
physical attacks, we turn to the state, for the church has no swords, and
we, being also citizens in good standing of the earthly nations, have as
much right to their protection as anyone (Acts 25:11). We know, however,
that when the church wins its
battle, no more swords will be needed; so the spiritual battle is still
the ultimate one.
Church and earthly nation are
related, then, as two different families with overlapping members,
occupying the same territory. They both serve the kingdom of God, but it
is misleading, in my view, to describe them as two
institutional forms of the kingdom coordinate with one another, as is
often done in Reformed literature.[28] The church is the
organization which has as its goal the spreading of God's kingdom through
the earth. The state, if it is not a Christian state, does not
share that goal at all, but may in spite of itself perform
some services to the kingdom of God. If the state is Christian, it will represent the church in its earthly
concerns, using earthly tools denied to the church as such, defending it
from physical attack and so forth. It will be a kind of adjunct
tool for the church, not an institution coordinate with it.
I should say more about what a
Christian nation and its state, as government of a Christian nation, might
be like.
(1) Then the nation and church will
have approximately the same membership.[29]
(2) Would such a nation be a
"holy" nation? Not in the sense that Old Testament Israel was,
for there will be no tabernacle or temple. But since the church is a holy
nation, and the membership of nation and church are virtually the same,
we can speak of the nation being "holy" because of the presence
of Christ in his people in that place through the Spirit.
(3) The church elders would come to
overshadow the state courts, pretty much the reverse of the situation
today. Most disputes within the society would be settled by the
church elders. But some state courts would remain (staffed by Christian elders
probably, for who else would be wise enough to solve disputes in a godly
way?) to serve the small unbelieving remnant of the population.
(4) The legislative and executive
branches of the state would seek to bring the laws of the land (and
their implementation) into accord with biblical standards. They
would still not put all of Old Testament law literally into practice. They
would have to re-apply those laws, making allowance for the lack of a
tabernacle or temple (see above), and taking account of other situational changes.[30]
(5) How should such a Christian
government treat the non-Christian religious minorities? Many today reject
the very idea of Christian government out of fear that such will
lead to a renewal of the religious wars of long ago, or to Christian Ayatollahs.
They fear the sort of religious persecutions many came to America's shores
to escape. That fear seems even more legitimate when we consider that in
the Mosaic law there were death penalties both for false worship and for
seducing others into the worship of false gods (Deut. 13:1-18, 17:1-7).
I agree with Vern Poythress that these death penalties are based upon
the special holiness of Israel. When God condescends to live in the midst
of a nation as did God in Israel, it is particularly insulting to permit
people to commit idolatry. It pollutes the holy land where he dwells.
That rationale for the punishments of Deut. 13 and 17 does not
apply to modern states. I agree with Poythress,
therefore, that the simple acts of publicly worshipping false gods and of
inciting others to do so should not be punished by the state.
However, to say this might lead some
to believe that in such a Christian state all religions should be treated
on a precisely equal basis, with no favoritism shown to any of
them, any such penalty being, in effect, a "penalty for false
worship." That would please the "principled pluralists,"
and it would bring some satisfaction to those who hold Kline's position.
But I cannot accept it, for it would in effect make a truly
Christian state impossible. A Christian state, if that name means
anything at all, is a state which observes Christian standards
in formulating and implementing the law. To do this is already
to "discriminate," to give a privileged position to one
religion over another.
To make the same point from another
perspective: all sin, and therefore all crime (crime on God's standards
being a subset of sin) is religious. The murderer is a rebel against
the true God, who says "You shall not kill." Similarly the
thief, the false witness, the rapist. People who do such things are
saying in their heart "there is no God" (Psm.
14:1), though they know in their hearts that God is real (Rom. 1:18-21).
Wickedness, evil, greed, depravity, all sins, come from the fact that
people "did not think it worthwhile to retain the knowledge of
God" (Rom. 1:28-32). Therefore, to punish murder is at the same time
to punish the murderer's religious decision to ignore God; it is
to punish the religious statement the murderer makes through
his crime. In his religion,
murder is not wrong, at least for him. In punishing him, the state is
telling him that at this point,
at least, he may not put his religion into practice.
This sort of issue, of course, comes
up very explicitly in the news from time to time. A Jehovah's Witness
refuses a blood transfusion to his dying child, parents in a healing
cult refuse medical treatment to their children, fanatical polygamists in
Utah kill off disloyal former followers. Even now, though American law
lacks a full Christian commitment, it discriminates against religiously
motivated actions of that sort. Defenses of such behavior based on
religious liberty are unacceptable. But the same thing happens,
essentially, in all criminal cases: the state is pitting its religious
commitment, such as it is, against that of the accused.
A godly state, therefore, would be
discriminating all the time against false religion. If such discrimination
is unavoidable even for non-Christian states, surely it is impossible
for a Christian state. The only question, then, is how far may such
discrimination go?
It by no means follows from these
remarks that no toleration of false religion is possible within a
Christian nation. I have said already that the mere acts of false
worship and of seduction to false worship ought to be legally tolerated by
a Christian state. Indeed, even Old Testament Israel, which executed those
who worshiped falsely in public, tolerated the presence of
"aliens" and "sojourners," even those aliens who
had not professed faith in the true God by circumcising the males
of their households. These were given explicit protections in the law
(Lev. 19:33, 25:6, Num. 15:16, 35:15).
This toleration in Israel depends
logically upon the important distinction between sin and crime. Many human
actions are sins against God which are not crimes punishable by
the state. The law of Moses lists many sins to which no penalty is attached.
The same distinction must be made by any modern nation which would strive
to emulate the "general equity" of the Mosaic law.
Keeping that distinction in mind, I
would think that a modern Christian state ought not to try to punish
unbelief as such or even the expression of that unbelief in false worship
or religious propaganda. It ought, however, to punish the expressions
of false religion in such crimes as murder and theft.
I think too that it would be
legitimate to limit the influence of false religion in society through
other means. A "Christian state" is, at minimum, a state
committed to follow the Word of God as its chief authority in all
governmental decisions. Such a commitment would doubtless be articulated
in a written constitution, to which public officials would be expected
to subscribe. As the rulers of Israel were required under
God's covenant to obey his law, and as modern American officials
are required to preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of
the United States, so, it seems to me, public officials in
a Christian state ought to be expected also to subscribe to
the constitution of that state which would, of course, entail
a Christian profession of faith.
How theologically detailed ought
that profession to be? It depends on how broad the Christian consensus is
at the time. The denominationalism of the present-day church is, in
my estimation, a terrible scandal for many reasons, and one which makes
it difficult, to be sure, to conceive of such a thing as a Christian
state. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a Christian state existing until God
removes from us in large measure the curse of denominationalism. But
should my imagination be too pessimistic in this matter, and should we
have the opportunity to lead the nation to a Christian commitment in our
present divided state, I would say that the various Christian groups will
simply have to see what they can agree upon and hope that over time that
agreed content will expand.
At any rate, I would see nothing
biblically objectionable, and much positive value in, requiring of
public officials a profession of faith in Christ and a commitment
to follow biblical standards in their public decisions.
Take the argument one step further:
why not also require a public profession as a qualification for the
privilege of voting? That idea may horrify some, but it should be
considered seriously. The idea of "one man, one vote" democracy
is not required by Scripture. Scripture allows, I think, many
specific forms of government (monarchy, oligarchy, aristocracy,
democracy, etc.). Reasonable people, I think, will agree that
democracy often fails in certain kinds of cultural settings (e.g.
Haiti, Latin America, Africa, prewar Germany), that sometimes
nations require more powerful leadership than democracy allows, simply
to avoid chaos. Successful democracy requires a literate and knowledgeable
electorate, relatively immune from temptations to pursue private interests
by political means and relatively willing to accept defeat in the interest
of maintaining public order. Many traditionally democratic nations such as
Britain and the U. S. compromised their democratic traditions during
war (remember, e.g., the internment of Japanese-Americans, the
recent "states of emergency" in Northern Ireland). Democracy has
much to be said for it in many contexts, and I certainly defend
its continuation in the present-day United States; but it is not
an eternal absolute. The scriptural
requirement is not that government be democratic,[31] but that government be
just, according to God's standards. With that in mind, we might ask
if the right to participate in government should be limited to
those willing to support and defend a Christian constitution.
Scripture leaves us free to qualify democracy in this way, and I think
such a qualification would do much to prevent the erosion of
Christian values within the political process.
Doubtless more could be said as to
how much tolerance/intolerance ought to be permitted in a Christian
state. I won't try to give a complete account here. It should
be evident, however, that the question is not a simple one of "shall we
tolerate or not?" Rather, there are many degrees and kinds
of toleration in many different situations, as is recognized by
the law of Moses. All of that would have to be worked out
carefully by the founding fathers of a Christian commonwealth.
Summary and
Conclusion
I have suggested that the state is
essentially the government of a tribe or clan with, to be sure, some
difference from the nuclear family in its rights and powers.
Theologically, states are the government of the earthly tribes, which will
in time be superseded by the government of the heavenly tribe,
the church. Until that time, however, a Christian state may serve
the church by resolving its temporal disputes with worldly powers.
To carry out this task faithfully, it must be obedient to the law
of God in Scripture, carefully applying that law to the
present situation, taking account of changes both in redemptive
history and in human culture.
[1] See, for instance, John H. Yoder, The Politics of Jesus (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1972).
[2] E. g. Albert G. Huegli, ed., Church and State Under God (St. Louis: Concordia, 1964), Helmut Thielicke, Theological Ethics, 3 vols., esp. Vols. 1 and 2, ed. William H. Lazareth (Phila.: Fortress, 1966).
[3] Kline, The Structure of Biblical Authority (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1972).
[4] Rousas J. Rushdoony, The Institutes of Biblical Law (n.p.: Craig Press, 1973), reviewed by me in Westminster Theological Journal 38:2 (Winter, 1976), 195-217, Greg L. Bahnsen, By This Standard (Tyler, Texas: Institute for Christian Economics, 1985), Bahnsen, Theonomy in Christian Ethics (Phillipsburg, N. J.: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1977), many other titles.
[5] E. g. Rockne McCarthy et al., Society, State and Schools: A Case for Structural and Confessional Pluralism (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1981).
[6] Common sense is not the final rule of exegesis, and it is not infallible. But it would certainly be a shame if we dispensed with it altogether.
[7] See his excellent book, The Shadow of Christ in the Law of Moses.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10]
It is misleading to define "ceremonial" etymologically
as "laws pertaining to ceremonies." Many of the laws commonly
grouped under the "ceremonial" category, such as dietary laws
clothing laws, have nothing to do with "ceremonies." And some
laws having to do with ceremonies, such as the "regulative
principle" and other doctrines concerning public worship, are
commonly described as moral rather than ceremonial laws.
[11] A number of writers have made good beginnings in this direction. See James B. Jordan, The Law of the Covenant (Tyler, Texas: Institute for Christian Economics, 1984), Gary North, Economic Commentary on the Bible, so far in three volumes: The Dominion Covenant: Genesis; Moses and Pharaoh; and The Sinai Strategy (Tyler, Texas: Institute for Christian Economics, 1982, 1985, 1986). Poythress, op. cit., Rousas J. Rushdoony, op. cit., Gordon Wenham, The Book of Leviticus (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1979). The conclusions of these books are not always consistent with one another, and the authors' exegesis is of uneven quality. But they are attempting to do what most needs to be done in this area.
[12] See Kline, "Lex Talionis and the Human Fetus," in Journal of the Evangelical Theological Society (1977), also published as a pamphlet. Here he advocates civil punishment for abortion based on his exegesis of Ex. 21:22-25.
[13] For my general comparison and assessment of Kline and Bahnsen, see my "The One, the Many, and Theonomy," forthcoming in a volume of essays on theonomy by Westminster Theological Seminary professors, edited by William S. Barker and W. Robert Godfrey.
[14] I realize this is a vague statement, but I don't think the following argument requires any additional precision.
[15] The listing in Exod. 6 ends there, since its purpose is to give the genealogy of Moses; a more complete account is found in Num. 26.
[16] I say "more or less," because sometimes an elder brother may have lost to a younger one his natural hereditary claim to family headship, as may have been the case with Ishmael and Esau.
[17] In his Institutes of Biblical Law (n.p.: Craig Press, 1973), Rousas J. Rushdoony argues that God withholds the death penalty from the family and gives it exclusively to the state (pp. 358-362). He bases this argument on the mark of Cain, which he sees as a protection against vengeance from within the family, and upon Deut. 21:18-21, in which although the parents are required to bring complaints against incorrigible children, the "men of the city," not the parents, execute the death penalty, contrary to the usual order in which the accusers are the executioners. Rushdoony may be right about the nuclear family. Not only the natural ties of love, but the need to bring more objective witnesses into the process would militate against the use of the death penalty within the nuclear family. But in a broader sense, the "men of the city" were family too. And, again, there were no institutions other than the family when God prescribed the death penalty to Noah.
[18] And note that even the nuclear family retains the use of force for self-defense, Exod. 22:2.
[19] Again, I am being purposefully vague. I don't know precisely the scope of their jurisdiction, though certainly it included the military. In the case of Samuel it seems to have included a regular ministry of resolving disputes (I Sam. 7:15-17). Nor do I know the geographical or tribal extent of their authority; some judges may have had only local significance and/or may have ruled only certain tribes or clans. Samuel, last and greatest of the judges, ruled "from Dan to Beersheba," i.e. the full extent of the land (I Sam. 3:20).
[20] Are these "elders" simply older men who advised Solomon, or are they also tribal rulers? I am not sure. 4:1-19 may list some or all of them.
[21] It is also evident in the case of the abortive kingship of Abimelech in Judges 9:1-57.
[22] Samuel Rutherford, in his influential Lex, Rex, (Harrisonburg, Va.: Sprinkle Publications, 1982; originally published 1644) offers a much more detailed defense of the popular basis of kingship, in the interest of defending "defensive war" by the people (under "lesser magistrates") against a king.
[23] Kline, "Divine Kingship and Gen. 6:1-4," Westminster Theological Journal 24 (1962), 187-204. In Kline's view, indeed, "kingship" is one of the major unifying themes of the early chapters of Genesis: God himself as royal creator, the sun and moon "ruling" day and night (1:16), etc., man to have dominion over the earth (1:28, 9:1-3), man's failure to exercise godly rule (chapter 3), the genealogies (see text).
[24]
There is, I would think, some
presumption that headship of an extended family
would be vested in the oldest male member of the family. The oldest son
normally received a double inheritance (Deut.
21:17), and therefore a kind of natural primacy over the other siblings
(and doubtless additional responsibility as well; see Rushdoony,
Institutes, 174-182) which may
have made him the natural choice as the tribal leader. But of course
primogeniture was often overridden. God chose Isaac over Ishmael and Jacob over Esau to
head the covenant family. And indeed God's choice of Jacob was ratified by
Esau himself, who sold his birthright, and by
Jacob, who (by deception, to be sure) blessed Jacob. The law forbids a
father to disinherit his first-born out of preference for a wife other
than the first-born's mother (Deut. 21:15-17),
but doubtless such disinheriting did take place for other reasons.
Granted, then, some flexibility in the law of inheritances, it is likely
that tribal leadership, similarly, was no
t based exclusively on seniority. We do have, again, the example of Jephthah in Judges 11, asked by the "elders of Gilead" (verse 5) to "be our head" (verse 8, re-emphasized in verses 9-11). Far from being a first-born, Jephthah was born of a prostitute and expelled by his brothers (verse 2). He was, they said, "not going to get any inheritance in our family." He was chosen, not because of primogeniture, but because of military competence (verse 1).
[25] We can, for convenience, think of the "extended family" as including one's direct ancestors two or three generations back, plus all the living descendants of those ancestors. But the definition isn't very important for the remaining argument.
[26] We can see, however, that in nations like Japan or Sweden, which have a relative uniformity of ancestry, government is in some respects easier. In such countries, there is less suspicion of one another, more readiness to defer to one another, to trust one another as "family." Socialism is somewhat less burdensome, for example, when to some extent the taxpayer knows, understands, and trusts the people who are receiving the benefits of the welfare state. I don't think that socialism, ultimately, is workable anywhere; but democratic socialism does seem to be most stable in those sorts of societies. (Of course, nondemocratic socialism achieves stability in proportion to the power and the ruthless dedication of government to destroy all opposition.)
[27] Geerhardus Vos, The Teaching of Jesus Concerning the Kingdom and the Church (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1951), 50.
[28] This sort of representation is common in both the Kuyperian-Dooyeweerdian and the Christian Reconstruction traditions.
[29] As in Old Testament Israel, not everyone in the nation would profess faith.
[30] E.g., relevant cultural changes. Since most people today do not entertain guests upon their roofs, we would not want a law which literally said the equivalent of Deut. 22:8; but we would want to incorporate the principle behind that law, namely that of maintaining safe facilities.
[31]
Although as I mentioned earlier, the
people ought to have some say in the establishment of a particular
political order, as in Israel's ratification of the kingship. Thus I
insist (with the theonomist tradition) that
there ought to be a popular consensus in favor of Christianity before a
Christian constitution is actually adopted by a nation.
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